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ABSTRACT
The financial crisis in the Eurozone is combining several new interdisciplinary debates. Has the 
financial crisis been caused by the decisions of the political actors or rather by complicated economic 
dilemmas? In what way have different social stakeholders acted during the years of the crisis and which 
of the groups have had the biggest influence in different stages of the crisis? Why and how national 
political elites have lost their dominant position in the crisis management, which have been the 
cornerstones of this power transition process and what role have the supranational institutions such 
as the European Commission and the European Central Bank played during the crisis? Accordingly, 
the main goal of the article is to define the crucial events and stakeholders in the Eurozone crisis 
solution process by using empirical process tracing and narrative analysis as the research methods. It 
will also inquire into how and why national political elites and citizens delegated their democratic 
competences and powers to non-electable institutions during the Eurozone crisis. 
INTRODUCTION
The European Union’s political, economic and academic elites during the last four years have 
been looking for a solution which would provide stabilization, security, and sustainability 
to the Euro and the Eurozone. This process has been complicated, slow and controversial 
as in times of economic crises; popular political goals sometimes tend not to be supported 
by the economic logic and interests of the majority of social groups. The solutions, at least 
the temporary ones, have been found even in cases when they were beyond the European 
Union´s legislative framework (the European Financial Stability Fund, EFSF) or by asking 
additional delegation of power to the European Union institutions from the member states 
(the European Stability Mechanism, ESM).
The question whether a theoretically reasonable economic solution for the Eurozone social 
stakeholders can also be politically popular and supported by economic elite is one of the 
most central ones to answer in this study. For the Eurozone, a long-term successful solution 
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providing sustainable growth will also need simultaneous political, economic, and public 
support. In the practical decision-making process, choices and options are certainly restricted 
by the economic realities and interests of different social stakeholder groups (voters, political 
elite, economic elite, administrative elite, and international monetary institutions). Finding 
a balance has been ever more challenging in terms of the growing global completion and 
particularly when considering the Eurozone problems along with labour market flexibility and 
ageing (Inotai 2011: 7–9). 
The situation is even more complicated as the main symbols of European integration (e.g., 
a single currency, harmonized interest rates for governmental bonds, structural funds and 
subsidies) may have been the variables causing the crisis in Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and 
Ireland. Join initiatives and common policies may, next to their positive effects, also have 
had some negative impact on the Eurozone’s employment (which is lower than the average 
employment of non-Eurozone member states of the EU), price flexibility, productivity in some 
member states, and overall competitiveness of the Eurozone. This leads us to the second 
research question which asks whether monetary integration can, or should be, simultaneously 
reasonable in economic terms and popular in political terms for all member states and their 
social stakeholders.
In theoretical aspects, the article focuses on the process of delegation and transition of 
democratic competences and powers to non-electable institutions by social stakeholders 
in a crisis situation. The first task of this paper is to map, evaluate, and analyse the main 
options for the solution of the Eurozone debt crisis. The next task is to identify the interests 
of social stakeholders related to debt crises and having political importance. The third part of 
the paper focuses on practical policy choices and their influence on the stakeholders during 
the Eurozone crisis in 2008–2012. The analytical part will focus first on the motivation of 
social stakeholders during the crisis, by also asking which choices were made on their own 
initiative and which ones were forced by the events of the crisis. The analytical part will also 
focus on the logic and patterns of interaction between market fluctuations and the Eurozone 
stakeholders´ reactive actions. The main argument of the research is that in the (Eurozone) 
crisis situation non-electable institutions tend to be more effective and tend to concentrate 
more power, because they do not need to be concerned smith on voters’ reactions.
The article is methodologically based on the process tracing and narrative analysis 
model; it will observe the Eurozone policy decisions and analyse these actions based on the 
motivation of social stakeholders. The research is empirically based on the official data on 
economic indicators and crises management programs of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
1. DISCUSSIONS AND DILEMMAS ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHOICES  
IN THE EUROZONE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Dilemmas and discussions in terms of political and economic choices and differentiating 
rationality for the Eurozone’s stakeholders have been debated actively over the last years 
among politicians, social scientists and academics (Papadimitrou and Wray 2011; Kregel 2011; 
Christova 2011). 
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In the framework of the EU institutional system, the rational participation of stakeholders 
is even more complex because of the multiple supranational institutional actors which 
complicate policy choices and actions (Van Schendelen 2002). From a broader perspective, 
different success criteria and values concerning the Eurozone have been discussed by Daniel 
Mugge (2011) who distinguishes the pragmatic and the dogmatic models of policymaking, 
claiming that there is a shift from pragmatism to dogmatism in the recent years, and the 
changed rules may be partly traced to the financial sector lobbying in the 1990s when large 
European banks identified cross-border capital markets as the key source of future profitability. 
The financial crisis has also raised the wider strategic question of the economic effects of 
the currency union without a fiscal union and opened a debate about the possible breakup of 
the Euro area because of the dissatisfaction of some member states with the outcomes of the 
single currency area (Eichengreen 2009: 4).
Vivien A. Schmidt (2010) drives this question even further by asking whether the EU 
has the economic governance capacity needed to come up to the challenges posed by the 
markets, whether the economic measures taken are the right ones to promote growth while 
calming markets and whether they are sustainable politically. Schmidt stresses that this is not 
only a question of European member-state leaders´ political ambition to deepen economic 
integration at a time when inward-looking politics is on the rise, but also whether their citizens 
are willing to put up with tough budget cuts at the time of rising unemployment, poverty, and 
inequality (Schmidt 2010). 
In the Eurozone’s case, the central dilemmas appear between economic rationality and 
political rationality and between the timeframes of stakeholders, as some of them operate in 
short-term frameworks and some stakeholders in a long-term scope (Lane 2010). 
For social groups and stakeholders, there is no confrontation between the political and the 
economic logic as well as the respective interests in long-term goals. A. Przeworski has shown 
that a good and responsible governance, together with economic growth, supports effective 
democracy in the long term (Przeworski 1991). Problems appear during a recession when it is 
hard to find simultaneously a winning scenario in terms of political popularity, social stability, 
and economic sustainability. This dilemma can lead to a situation in which the actual policy 
implementation may play a secondary role since economic and political circumstances offer 
no quick fix and public popularity for political stakeholders (Schmidt 2010; Mugge 2011).
The dilemma between political and economic priorities can also appear in cases of 
politically important and socially symbolic but economically complicated or ineffective 
processes. For example, the single currency Euro has, from the political point of view, been 
the symbol of a successful European integration which should hence be protected at all costs. 
However, from the economic point of view, there is a possibility that the Euro as a single 
currency will not meet the economic needs of all the Eurozone member states or is, thus, in 
itself a cause of the debt crisis and dropping economic productivity (debated in Eichengreen 
2009; Bernanke 2005; Alexiou and Nellis 2012; Notermans 2012).  
This effect is illustrated in Figure 1 which visualizes how the single currency has widened 
the industrial production gap among the member states (Germany and Italy) as disabling the 
balancing tools (revaluation or devaluation) used in the period of national currencies. 
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As seen in Figure 1, in the pre-euro period from year 1982 to year 1999, the industrial 
gap between Italy and Germany was effectively balanced by the pressure and possibility 
of devaluation (Italy) or revaluation (Germany). Since the introduction of the Euro in 1999 
(marked as the 100% level for both countries in Figure 1), the industrial gap started growing 
again, at first slowly, but increasingly faster after 2002. As a result, in 2010 Germany has 
reached the industrial production level of 130% as compared with the level of 1999, while the 
Italian Industrial production has dropped to 80% of the 1999 level. 
The viability of effective currency unions without a fiscal union has been one of the 
most debated dilemmas in the context of the Eurozone financial crisis in the recent years. 
Of course, the matter was debated already during the foundation of the common currency, 
because a single currency itself can hardly serve all the different interests of the member 
states and stakeholders, such as the growing and recessionary economies or centrally located 
large exporters and remotely located consumer economies (Friedman and Mundell 2001). 
From the political perspective, it is not only economic sustainability and stability that 
can produce political popularity and the public support of voters. A limited or temporary 
governmental overspending combined with a high living standard can also be a source of 
political popularity, especially when the existence of a currency union may allow enjoying the 
debt-financed welfare longer than it would be possible in the undistorted market conditions 
(debated in Eltetö 2011: 37–38). For example, when the Italian industrial production index 
(see Figure 1) in 2012 was by 43% lower than the German production index, then the GDP 
per capita was only by 26% lower than the German GDP per capita. (In this comparison, as 
a counterbalance, we need also to admit that Germany exceeds all the other EU member 
states in the comparative importance of industry for the whole economy, while Italy is 
FIGURE 1. Industrial production index in Germany and Italy,  
1982–2012 (year 2000 index = 100), OECD database 2012
Industrial production gap that began with the Euro
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perhaps characterised by the opposite trends). The advantage is more visible for countries 
with a low productivity, because these countries do not experience the negative effects of 
reducing productivity, such as a higher inflation and higher interest rates, at least for the 
time being.
Limited overspending inside a currency union can also be supported by lenders for 
restricted periods, if the risks are reduced by the existence of a single currency and the 
expectations on profit are higher than the rates offered by countries with a balanced budget 
and a low debt. The growing foreign debt is not a problem per se for creditors as the exchange 
rate and interest rates should not be threatened or influenced by the national debt. At least, 
this had been the vision before the Greek crisis in 2009 (debated in Notermans 2012, 9–10). 
By keeping their consumption level high, these countries also supported exporting countries 
as they are buying their products and securing them with new reserves and investments. The 
financial surplus of capital exporters (countries having a current account surplus) is balanced 
by capital demand from consumer countries having a current account deficit (Kregel 2011). As 
a result, consumer economies can keep consuming as long as foreign investors want to lend 
their capital to consumer economies at the offered interest rates. 
Market feedback in this situation would be restricted by the single currency (see Figure 3), 
and market reactions are not only reflecting the actual performance of a member state, but 
also the stabilizing effect of the Eurozone (including possible supportive bond purchases and 
bail-outs, if needed). The economic argument here might be that, if influencing the interest 
rates is responsible, it would offer much lower summarized interest costs for the whole 
Eurozone. Or else why to consider the option with market-based higher interest rates at all, 
when a central bank like the ECB can produce as low interest rates and as much additional 
resources as needed (Draghi 2012)? 
In this situation, the logical question arises: which stakeholder group should be motivated 
for a change of lowered interest rates or which change can be advised? The second important 
question in this dilemma is which stakeholder groups should pay the cost of interest rate 
synchronization and how much tax payers in the Eurozone are ready to spend on it (Kregel 
2011). 
Short-term politically desirable (popular) goals (like subsidies) can also lead to immediate 
negative economic effects. A correlation between the Eurozone crisis reduction tools and 
unemployment levels in target countries is here a suitable practical example (Figure 2). As 
visualized by Figure 2, the Eurozone member states, which spend hundreds of billions of 
Euros on the financial and social stabilization, have suffered higher unemployment rates as 
compared with non-Euro states which adapted more quickly to the crisis. As a result, the 
Euro area labour market is becoming less flexible and is losing its productivity versus the 
other members of the European Union and also global competitors (debated in Inotai 2011: 
7–9).
Accordingly, in some aspects of the Euro-currency, what should have been the symbol of 
stability and growth has turned to cause rigidity and stagnation for many a user (Kregel 1999). 
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2. STAKEHOLDERS’ INTERESTS AND POWERS IN THE EUROZONE CRISIS
The previously debated Eurozone´s economic circumstances and dilemmas have a different 
value and importance from the perspectives of different groups of stakeholders. Accordingly, 
social stakeholders and their specific interests play a central role when analyzing the Eurozone´s 
economic dilemmas and choices during policy formulation and implementation. The main 
dependent variable in analyzing the stakeholders’ role in the Eurozone policy-making process 
is ´gaining power´, which can be defined as “having a growing juristiction to independent 
(sovereign) decision-making or resource allocation, and having a growing dominant role in 
cooperative decision-making with other stakeholders”. 
The stakeholder theory was first addressed in organizational management and business 
ethics by R. Edward Freeman in “Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach” in which he 
identified and modeled the interest groups of a company as well as described and proposed 
methods of meeting the interests of these groups. The categories of the classification of social 
stakeholders are based on power, influence, need, value, and legitimacy (Mitchell and Wood 
1997, Cameron, Seher and Crawley, 2010). Stakeholders´ evaluation can additionally consist of 
their attitude (passive or active, positive or negative), their ability to identify themselves (form 
a group), and their ability of communication and cooperation (Turner and Kristoffer 2002). R. 
Phillips (2003) distinguishes between the organization’s normatively legitimate stakeholders, 
to whom the organization holds a moral obligation, and derivately legitimate stakeholders 
whose status derives from their ability to affect the organization or its normatively legitimate 
stakeholders. 
In the business terminology, in addition to shareholders, the stakeholders include 
governmental bodies, political groups, trade associations, trade unions, communities, 
financers, suppliers, employees, and customers (Freeman 1984). 
FIGURE 2. Unemployment in the Euro area and in the EU-27, OECD database 2012
Euro area and EU-27 unemployment rate
Euro area (EA-17), seasonally adjusted series EU-17, seasonally adjusted series
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The stakeholders influencing and influenced by the management of the Eurozone crisis 
discussed in this paper include individuals, economic actors, political elites, supranational EU 
institutions (the ECB and the European Commission), and international monetary institutions. 
Some of these groups consist also of influential sub-groups representing interests different 
from those of the majority of the group. Stakeholders’ actions will be analyzed in the categories 
of their power, influence, value, activity, influence, attitude, and legitimacy.
Individuals as a stakeholder group include the Eurozone taxpayers and groups dependent 
on the state financing and benefits, citizens and non-citizens; as a result, the interests inside 
this group are not coherent. Individuals as a stakeholder group are mainly interested in 
high certainty and security regarding the economic outlook (consumer confidence), high 
employment levels, high salaries, low taxes, high-level benefits from the state, but they tend 
to be passive as their expectations are met (Dahl 1991).
Individuals can be partly seen as economic actors, as they are holders of government bonds, 
stocks, and shares of pension funds. A higher consumer confidence encourages spending and 
lending (or saving, depending on interest rates), which then supports the GDP growth and the 
increase of tax payments to governments. Individuals tend to be rationally egoistic, wishing 
a lower taxation in years of economic growth and expecting government support in years of 
crisis (Lijphart 1999). At the same time, most individuals make their economic policy choices 
without a deep knowledge of national budget and economic policy options (Birch 1993).
Citizens are the source of legitimacy for the political elite, and their main power is voting 
in elections. As citizens control the political system through ballot boxes, their interests need 
to be met on a short-term basis, otherwise the ruling politicians will be replaced by another 
set of political elite (Lipset 1959). Innovations and restructuring, productivity and export 
capability very seldom find a high place on the long-term wish-list of national political choices 
(Inglehart 1997). 
Inside this stakeholders’ group, sub-groups have different preferences in the crisis 
resolution process, mainly depending on whether they are net-payers or net-receivers in 
relation with taxation and state budget. While taxpayers tend to reject additional taxation and 
prefer to support austerity as a sustainable solution, subsidized groups, on the contrary, tend 
to support additional taxation or additional money supply to safeguard their own incomes. 
Some countries and their citizens  can also have a different position to austerity if they are the 
so-called net-payers and net-savers. The stakeholders’ influence becomes more complicated 
in case when net payers are an influential group among capital controllers (like Germany, 
Nordic countries, and Benelux are in the EU).
Which solution will be chosen by the political elite depends not only on the balance 
among those groups, but also on how actively they express their interests (Lipset 1959). 
Governmental bonds offer in this case a comfortable short-term exit-strategy by allowing 
keeping taxes on the previous level, but also keep offering subsidies and political popularity.
The economic actors as a stakeholder group include a wide range of small and medium-
sized businesses, national and international level business actors, representatives of 
industry and services, also involving the networks of business actors, lobby groups, umbrella 
organizations and trade unions. The main difference in their interests and actions follows 
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from whether they are tax-payers, receivers of the state or the EU funding, or investors, and 
whether they are acting locally or internationally. As to international businesses, the majority 
of them benefit from economic stability and growth both for operating and investing, a 
smaller number of them expect the subsidies to be available, the first being more active in 
lobbying for the market conditions and the latter for the conditions of aid. A small number of 
the sub-groups of business sector stakeholders benefit from the market fluctuations and crisis 
and are actors on the financial and stock markets. 
Long-term economic actors are interested in a stable and growing economic environment, 
steady inflation, a stable GDP growth, relatively low interest rates, relatively low taxation levels, 
an efficient regulative framework, growth regarding the economic outlook (indicated as business 
confidence), access to cheap funding (interest levels across the Eurozone), low taxation levels 
also for the companies exporting beyond the Eurozone (Kregel 1999). The majority of business 
groups are interested in a fast relief during the crisis, additional financial programs, keeping 
the employment and consumption levels and ensuring financial sector security. They take less 
interest in the restructuring of economies, bankruptcies, high unemployment and shrinking 
government budgets. Low-level losses for all social groups through inflation and additional 
taxation are preferred to sharp losses for those who took the risks. The growing debts are not 
seen as problematic as long as there is a capability to service them. 
As the business actors are also major financers or influencers of political parties, these 
preferences are communicated to political elite (Lipset 1959). Some business groups prefer 
a consolidation of finances through budgetary austerity measures, claiming that it cuts 
deficits fast and should thus produce stability and growth. At the same time, pro-growth 
experts favour a continued accommodating monetary policy and lower interest rates, or even 
quantitative easing, modest inflation, and moderate cuts over a long term to promote growth 
(Darling 2010). 
The speculative participants inside the group of economic actors are interested in 
fluctuating prices and markets, which mainly come from uncertainty. They have a long-
term view and are interested in the sustainability of the underlying asset for a long term 
(Papadimitrou and Wray 2011). Speculators have generally a short-term view, and they are 
interested in fluctuations in price changes (Papadimitrou and Wray 2011).
The differences in terms of the crisis solution scenarios inside a group of economic actors 
are depending on the following variables: a) support to budget growth or to austerity; b) 
support to inflation or price-stability; c) support to centralized redistribution or to market 
economy, d) support to economic stability or instability, e) support to creditors’ interests or 
to debtors’ interests.
National political and administrative elite is one of the central, most active, most 
powerful and communicational stakeholder groups in process influencing and decision-
making regarding the Eurozone governance and policies (Held 2006). 
Currently, most of the influential decisions regarding the Eurozone crisis management are 
negotiated and agreed by the leaders of the Eurozone countries (during the European Council 
meetings and separate high-level meetings), ministers of finance, and presidents of national 
central banks. 
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Most of top politicians (prime-ministers and ministers of finance) managing the crisis 
are not directly elected by the citizens but appointed by national parliaments (which is 
common in modern democracy). The most influential directly elected politicians in terms of 
European affairs are the directly elected heads of states (French president) and members of 
the European affairs committees of national parliaments, giving the mandate and setting the 
decision limits for national ministers. Before the year 2008 and at the start of the crisis, the 
norm was that parliamentary decisions on extraordinary actions need to be taken and voted 
at plenary sessions. This has gradually been replaced by mandates given by the committees of 
the EU affairs (De Grauwe 2010).  In everyday decision-making, though, the importance of the 
minister’s cooperation and information with expert civil servants in the field is often higher 
than the cooperation with the parliament. 
Among with political and administrative elite actors, also the approach “member states 
of the Eurozone” (Germany, Estonia, Finland etc.) are used often as a group or type of 
stakeholders. The opposition between the debitor (net-payers) and creditior countries is also 
often used in this context. However, theoretically it would be more correct to define national 
governments, ruling coalitions or national political elite in this aspect as stakeholders.
Supranational political and administrative institutions within the Eurozone, in the 
Eurozone context are mainly the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB).
These institutions are either independently elected by their own members (or 
shareholders) or nominated by national parliaments, governments or presidents. Differently 
from national politicians, administrative elites (national central banks and the ECB), these 
institutions do not need to concern about their popularity as their members are not directly 
elected. Supranational or administrative actors tend to follow the neo-institutional motivation 
model in which the rules and norms tend to dominate over the idealist goals and broader 
gains (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). The central corner-stones of the neo-institutional model 
are the dominance of legal rules, standardized procedures and administrative habits, support 
of comfortable, secure compromise solutions, and rational choice and compliance (Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni 2006; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
International intergovernmental (financial) institutions (mainly the IMF in the Eurozone 
context), which are directly participating in managing the Eurozone crisis (by giving out loans 
to problematic countries) are interested (in the short term) in stable financial markets that 
don’t experience huge distortions or extreme volatility, but are gaining profit from loans. In 
the long term, international institutions are interested in a stable global growth. 
3. TRACING THE POLITICAL PROCESS: EFFECTS OF STAKEHOLDERS’ ACTIONS  
IN THE EUROZONE CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
In the beginning of 2013, the majority of the leaders of the Eurozone countries and the 
president of the European Council have expressed their belief that the worst part of the 
financial crisis is over, and the political decisions taken to solve the crisis have been successful 
(Van Rompuy 2013, 1). This is in sharp contrast with the statements made by the same leaders 
only six months ago when the interest rates on sovereign debts were at their 10-year highest 
Why and how supranational institutions became central stakeholders in the Eurozone debt crisis... 59
(especially for Southern Europe), the Euro was at its five-year lowest exchange rate against the 
dollar, and unemployment in many Euro-area countries was rising fast, reaching its highest 
rate of alltimes. Which have been the main actions of markets’ and stakeholders’ activities to 
influence the crisis?
During the first period of the global financial crisis, in 2008–2009, it was considered 
possible that member states and local actors could handle the debt problems themselves 
by adjusting their budgets and cutting deficits while financial markets would offer enough 
refinancing for the states with an acceptable level of interest rates. No special European level 
interference measures were seen necessary or used. At this stage, national political elites 
were the most influential stakeholders in the process. 
The situation changed in 2010 when it became evident that some member states with 
debt problems were unable to continue lending from the markets and refinance their 
obligations. This led to the situation in which the market’s and investors’ trust towards 
the Eurozone member states’ financial stability started to differentiate. Starting from year 
2009, the levels of interest rates on sovereign debt (government bonds) across the Eurozone 
member states, which had been consolidated and synchronized after the Euro introduction, 
started to differentiate rapidly again. This created an additional interest payment pressure on 
already highly indebted countries. 
Figure 3 illustrates the interest rates of government bonds, showing the pre-Euro market 
situation, the consolidated period between the years 2001–2008, and the crisis development 
where the major difference occurred in 2011 when the difference between bonds of Germany 
and Greece experienced a gap of 800% (the first having near a 2% and the latter a 16% rate).
From the stakeholders’ perspective, it meant that, next to political elites, voters on the 
one hand and supranational institutions on the other started to be engaged more actively 
FIGURE 3. Interest rates of selected Eurozone member states’ national bonds in 1995–2011, 
OECD database 2012
Development in Intrest Rates on 10-year Government Bonds
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in the discussion and solution seeking. The first major action in fighting the Eurozone crisis 
was to bail out three member states of the Eurozone (first Ireland, then Greece and Portugal) 
which could not finance themselves due to excessively high interest rates requested by the 
financial markets. 
The problem for the Eurozone and for the EU was both legal and economic. Firstly, in legal 
terms, the Lisbon Treaty in articles 123, 124 and 125 clearly states that member states have 
their own responsibility in terms of budgetary obligations and other member states, and the 
EU institutions are not allowed to bail them out. Secondly, in economic terms, the amount 
of resources necessary for a bail-out were far bigger than the annual EU budget. Hence, the 
member states faced remarkable additional costs. As the costs without bail-outs seemed even 
bigger, it was seen rational to ignore the treaty articles and to collect a bail-out fund instead 
of relying on the market process (Purju 2012: 16).    
The nature of the crisis and the measures taken were expected to be temporary, although 
a need for a European level interference was admitted. The volume of the summarized 
stabilization capabilities grew fast to 750 billion Euros for the end of 2012, which is quite 
remarkable as compared with the annual EU budget in the size of 129 billion Euros.
At the institutional level, it led to the creation of the European Financial Stability Mechanism 
(EFSM) in May 2010, the Greece Loan Facility (GLF), the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) in May 2010, and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in September 2012 (Purju 
2012: 18–19). Some of these institutions were created in accordance with the existing 
treaty bases (EFSM), others were created beyond the EU legal framework (EFSF), and some 
institutions needed an additional legal mandate to be created by the member states (ESM). 
Firstly, the European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) was created by the EU and the 
IMF with resources up to 60 billion Euros. The EFSM used its financial tools mainly to provide 
loans to Ireland and Portugal. As a parallel process and as the second pillar, the Greece Loan 
Facility (GLF) was created by the same stakeholders (the EU, the IMF, and the EU member 
states) with the fund of 110 billion Euros to support the refinancing Greece’s debt (Purju 2012: 
18). This institutionalization process was dominated by the EU member states and by the IMF.
As the third pillar of the stabilization measures, the European Financial Facility (EFSF) was 
created after intense debates in May 2010 (Christova 2011, 52). Here, the technical solution 
was different; the EFSF was created as a private fund and completely beyond the treaty 
framework. What made it special was its scope its liabilities went up to 780 billion Euros, 
guaranteed by the member states. The EFSF was also expected to take over the liabilities of 
the EFSM and the GLF (Purju 2012: 18-19). 
A vital part of the plan of creating the stabilization mechanisms and institutions was to 
convince the markets that bail-outs were conducted in a centralized way and would continue, 
if needed. All three mechanisms were created beyond the usual treaty framework and its 
procedures by a special mandate of the member states and their political elites. Both the 
Eurozone voters and its supranational institutions played a secondary role when the EFSM, 
the GLF, and the EFSF were designed and launched. 
The institutional build-up and the voting mechanism of the EFSF followed not the logic of 
the European Union institutions in which small states are over-represented as compared with 
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bigger member states, but the logic of the IMF in which representation is directly reflecting 
the financial participation. Accordingly, six bigger member states of the Eurozone, which 
are also the biggest shareholders in the EFSF, are able to control the financial decisions of 
the EFSF, while small states and the EU supranational institutions have a very low impact on 
decision-making.
In October 2010, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was launched, ESM treaty was 
signed on 2 February 2012 and became effective on 27 September 2012, both intended to 
replace (take over) the obligations of the EFSF. The ESM with the capital of 700 billion Euros 
will offer in total 500 billion euros lending capabilities and is planned to take over the liabilities 
of the EFSF (Christova 2011: 52). The ESM was created by a separate treaty amending Article 
136 of the TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The ESM decision-making 
followed the model of the IMF and not of the EU in which every member has its governor 
on the board, but the number of votes reflects the amount of shares (Estonia has 0.186% of 
votes and shares, while Germany has 27.146% of votes and shares). The ESM, even having 
17 member states, can in normal circumstances be controlled by the votes of three biggest 
shareholders – Germany, France, and Italy, having together over 65% of votes. The emergency 
voting procedure is based on a qualified majority requiring at least 80% of votes (The ESM 
Treaty, Chapter 2, Article 4).
The European Central Bank (ECB) used its additional tools (the SMP, the LTRO, and the OMT) 
to influence the crisis stabilization. The solution was seen in promoting the budget austerity 
and offering refinancing programs for the indebted governments and the commercial banks 
owning governmental debts. In this stage of the crisis management, the political and economic 
elites of member states and the supranational administrative elite were working in effective 
cooperation. The options taken by them were aimed at a fast stabilization in the fiscal aspect, 
pushing down the lending costs, and making more room for the future reforms by national 
governments. Supporting the bond market also worked in the interests of the business elite. 
In 2010, the Security Markets Program (SMP) was started by the ECB to support Greek and 
Portuguese governments’ bonds in the secondary market. Later, the program also supported 
the bonds of Spanish and Italian governments. In this period, the importance of the European 
Central Bank started growing, and the importance of national political elites in the policy-
making process gradually started to decrease. 
In December 2011, the additional Long-term Refinancing Operations (LTRO) were 
announced by the ECB, providing two rounds of cheap loans to the Eurozone commercial 
banks. They were was intended to guarantee liquidity in the financial markets that were 
refusing to lend money. The main aim of the 2011 LTRO was to provide for the liquidity in the 
Eurozone banks. The 2011 LTRO was offering 489 billion Euros for up to three years, with 1% 
interests for the Eurozone commercial banks to buy the Eurozone governments’ bonds. The 
LTRO programs were intended as a short-term solution to win time for the European political 
elite to carry out reforms and implement austerity measures while not suffering from even 
higher interest rates. As a result, 523 commercial banks participated, and the biggest amounts 
of loans were distributed to the banks of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. On 29 February, 
the additional LTRO2 was offered in the amount of 529 billion Euros. 
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The ECB was also ready to continue increasing its Monetary Transactions Program (OMT) to 
replace the previously accomplished bond buying program, but this time the bond purchases 
would be conditional and would only take place if the Eurozone member state would apply 
for the OMT assistance. The OMT was supported by Mario Draghi´s speech on 26 July 2012: 
“To the extent that the size of these sovereign premia hamper the functioning of the monetary 
policy transmission channel, they come within our mandate. Within our mandate, the ECB is 
ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro, believe me, it will be enough” (Bloomberg 
2012).
With the OMT, the ECB aimed to remove political risk from the financial markets. The 
ECB succeeded with the LTRO, the OMT, and President Mario Draghi´s convincing speeches 
in restoring the confidence in financial markets, lowering significantly interest rates for highly 
indebted countries, and restoring the lending ability for all national governments in the 
Eurozone. Accordingly, the OMT effectively created a backstop, a firewall to the European debt 
market which was convinced that the ECB was buying the European debt in any necessary 
amount. In terms of lowering the interest rates and stabilizing the lending costs, the results 
were evident: The German interest rates thus dropped below 2%, and the Greece’s rates, 
which in summer 2012climbed to 16% (even reaching above 36%), on the ten-year debt have 
decreased to around 11% (Bloomberg 2013).
The ECB achieved the stabilization of governments’ bond prices quite a moderate growth 
of money supply as compared, for example, with the Bank of England, the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank (Figure 4) (Merk 2012). In this case, the promise of 
Mario Draghi “to do whatever is needed” worked very well, even without an additional supply 
of Euros. Accordingly, there was no actual pressure on the growth of inflation in the Eurozone, 
and the option of an additional money supply is still available, if needed, in the next stage of 
the crisis (Merk 2012). Figure 4 also shows that the most active growth of the ECB balance 
sheet took place in the period of July 2011 – February 2012, and the situation for the ECB has 
stabilized since that. 
This process indicates also that the markets and investors in the crisis situation were more 
concerned with the political decisiveness and consolidation than the actual interference 
measures. When the clear and confident message was given by Mario Draghi to the markets, 
the interest rates started dropping.  
A special aspect in the transfer of initiative and power to the ECB competence was the 
aspect of the ECB not to apply power to the member states or other EU institutions’ fiscal or 
budgetary priviledges, but to use only the ability to create an additional supply of money and 
loans to reduce the level of interest rates of the governments’ bonds.
From the perspective of the businesses elite and voters, the options offered by the ECB 
were more in their favour than the formerly proposed austerity measures or the redistribution 
of debt by Eurobonds, which both would have created uncertainty regarding the future. Likely, 
the higher taxation levels would negatively influence, hiring, investment and consumption. 
Together with spending cuts, which influences the public sector payrolls and employment 
level in addition to smaller social benefits, austerity measures would hurt the economic 
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fundamentals and outlook, creating the vicious cycle of a lower demand, a lower economic 
growth, and a higher unemployment. There were, of course, some exceptions; for example, 
the German public was critical about the monetary measures chosen by the ECB.
As is seen from the actual initiatives and actions taken during the financial crisis, the 
level of participation of different stakeholders changed significantly in 2008–2012. National 
political leaders (political elite) were the main group of stakeholders in 2008–2010 when the 
Eurozone rescue options were debated at numerous European Council and G7 meetings. 
National leaders had been also debating the financial stability topics in the G20 meetings 
since 2008 in order to involve China, Brazil, India and other growing economic powers into the 
regulation of the world finances. This was related with the expectation that the regional and 
international cooperation would build sufficient confidence in the markets. The dominance of 
the intergovernmental method was based also on the British and the Italian support of this 
method and a good personal cooperation between Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. 
However, the financial developments of the Eurozone also triggered social and political 
reactions and changes. In 2011, when it became more evident that the intergovernmental 
method cannot produce necessary confidence in the markets, political leaders began 
gradually losing the support of voters and the economic elite. The results differed: the 
German chancellor Angela Merkel saved her position but turned to a more passive approach 
in terms of the Eurozone decision making, whereas the French president Nicolas Sarkozy lost 
his popularity; the lost also the elections and was replaced by socialist Francois Hollande in 
May 2012. The Italian prime-minister Silvio Berlusconi was also forced to resign from office 
in November 2011 and was replaced by technocratic Mario Monti. The British prime-minister 
David Cameron kept his popularity among the voters by turning openly against The Eurozone 
stabilization program and the plans of a fiscal union (Daily Mail 2011). 
FIGURE 4. Balance sheets of selected central banks, 2008–2012 (Merk 2012)
Cumulative Change in Central Bank Balance Sheets 
(Since August 2008)
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This process, combined with quite a passive attitude from the European Commission and 
its president Manuel Barroso, lead to the logical transition of additional power and initiative 
to the European Central Bank. When the national political elites were no more interested 
and able to make necessary political decisions and the European Commission was in many 
aspects restricted by the EU legal and budget limitations, the ECB was the main motivated, 
legally competent and capable actor for taking initiative to develop efficient counter-crisis 
measures. Of course, the national governments did not withdraw completely and continued 
to influence the stabilization process: the Stability Plus Pact, the second round of bail-outs and 
saving Cyprus are the main examples of their continuing efforts and participation in solving 
the Eurozone crises. In the longer run, also the importance and influence of the European 
Commission may grow again when the budgetary deficit control tools are agreed upon with 
the member states and implemented. 
The attention of the public and the media was having a stronger impact on the Eurozone 
policy making when national political leaders were the dominant policy drivers and during the 
active rescue operations. When the situation in the bond markets cooled down and started 
to be initiated by supranational institutions, the attention to and the impact of the media 
reduced.
To conclude, despite the described efforts and optimism of the political elites of the 
Eurozone member states, there are actually no indicators of any improvement in the economic 
conditions in the Eurozone. On the contrary, according to the core economic indicators of the 
member states (unemployment, governments’ debt, and industrial production), the situation 
in the beginning of 2013 is worse than it was in 2009 when the current crisis started and mainly 
a temporary stabilization has been achieved. Accordingly, additional efforts of stakeholders to 
create an effective stabilization and growth package for the Eurozone are needed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research issues of this study are focused on the current Eurozone financial crisis and 
discuss the choices that available for decision makers, the stakeholder groups that have 
influenced the actual policy outcome, the ways the balance-of-power has been changing 
during the crisis management, and how the supranational institutions such as the European 
Central Bank have participated in the process. 
The research has revealed that the main gainer in the process of power division among 
the stakeholders has been the supranational European Central Bank, whereas the main losers 
of power have been national political elites (national governments). The choice to become 
a passive actor for the national political elites was in some cases voluntary (the UK and 
Germany), and in some cases it was forced upon them by elections (Italy and France). The 
changes were initiated by the possibility to lose popularity among voters or the actual loss of 
elections because of the economic pressure. Accordingly, in this respect, the voters and the 
business elite as stakeholders controlled the choices of the political elite, but the final decision 
to delegate and transfer some executive power to non-electable institutions was made by the 
national political elites while creating the crisis management programs and institutions. 
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The decision-making space left from the national political elites was filled by the 
administrative supranational elite having no direct democratic mandate and therefore also 
no direct pressure from the voters and no need to concern about public popularity. As a 
result, the stakeholders having a democratic mandate decided to change for a more passive 
approach while the stakeholders having no democratic mandate were offered more room 
to act. If in the beginning of the Eurozone crisis national governments were the dominant 
group in strategy choosing and decision making, by the end of the year 2012 the influence of 
supranational institutions (the European Commission and the ECB) and national governments 
has equalized, as both groups are having their parallel initiatives. This change has been 
effective when looking at market reactions to bond prices and credit ratings, but it has also 
included some loss of democratic control and weakened the inclusion of smaller member 
states.
Accordingly, in terms of the future institutional reform, the question how to build a 
democratic but economically sustainable Eurozone has become even more complicated 
than before the crisis. As a result of the developments in 2012, active changes will have to 
come from a balanced cooperation of the national political elite, the ECB, and the European 
Commission. 
During the last four years, reactions to the financial crisis have been cyclically repeating, 
and each new bond market disturbance has been met by a growing action of the EU 
institutions. As the Cyprus banking crisis in March 2013 has started, financial complications 
are not yet over, and the stabilization mechanism needs an additional development in terms 
of legal bases and institutions. 
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